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Longitudinal Analysis of Strike Activity
ABSTRACT
This paper presents evidence on two aspects of strike activity
associated with the renegotiation of union contracts: the effects of
contract characteristics on dispute probabilities; and the effects of
lagged strike outcomes on the incidence and duration of subsequent
disputes. The empirical results show that strike probabilities are
higher following a longer contract, and lower in limited reopening
situations. Strike probabilities are also higher in summer and fall
than in winter and spring. Finally, strike probabilities are signif i—
cantly affected by lagged strike outcomes. Relative to a peaceful
settlement, strike probabilities are 10 percentage points higher
following a strike of two weeks or less, and 5 to 7 percentage points
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I.Introduction
The growing availability of data on collective bargaining settle-
ments in the union sector has generated widespread interest In the
empirical analysis of strikes.L" In contrast to earlier studies based
on the aggregate number of strikes, recent studies have shifted atten-
tion to the micro—level determinants of strike outcomes.Li' This paper
focuses on the time-series variation in bargaining-pair-specific strike
outcomes. Evidence is presented from a panel of collective bargaining
agreements on two sources of variation: changes in the characteristics
of the collective bargaining agreement that affect subsequent strike
outcomes; and the effects of lagged strike outcomes on the incidence and
duration of subsequent disputes.
The first part of the paper addresses the question of whether
bargaining parties can vary the probability of future work stoppages by
their choice of contract characteristics. I concentrate on three
aspects of the preceding contract: the expiration month of the
contract; the duration of the contract; and the provision of a limited
reopening clause, which restricts subsequent negotiations to a small
number of issues (usually wages). The empirical analysis shows that
strike probabilities are higher following a long contract, and lower in
limited reopening situations. Strike probabilities are also higher
following expirations in summer and fall, relative to winter and spring.
The second part of the paper addresses the question of whether
strike probabilities and durations are affected by preceding strike—2—
outcomes. Contrary to the findings of previous researchers, there is
no evidence of state-dependence in strikeincidence.—' The absence of
simple state-dependence, however, is the product of two competing
effects: an increase in strike probabilities following a strike of less
than 14 days duration; and a decrease in strike probabilities following
a longer work stoppage. In contrast to the effects of lagged strike
outcomes on subsequent strike probabilities, the effects on subsequent
durations are small and imprecisely measured.
II. Data Description
The data in this study represent strike outcomes for contract nego-
tiations of 253 bargaining pairs during the period from 1955 to 1979.
Contract terms and strike information were originally collected from the
Bureau of Labor Statistic's Current Wage Developments (CWD) by Wayne
Vroman.—" Vroinan's data set contains information on some 300 collec-
tive bargaining situations covering 1,000 or more workers. For purposes
of this paper, however, I have focused on bargaining pairs with complete
information on at least seven consecutive agreements. The resulting
sample contains 2,543 contracts, or an average of ten contracts per
bargaining pair.
Table 1 presents a cross—tabulation of the data by industry. With
the exception of contracts for seven bargaining pairs in transportation,
communications, and public utilities, the contracts are drawn from the
manufacturing sector. The coverage within two-digit manufacturing
industries is irregular, and reflects Vroman's original interest in-3-
"pattern" bargaining and wage determination. The data set contains
single—employer contracts covering multiple establishments (such as the
Autoworkers' agreements with General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler),
multiple-employer agreements (such as the Distillery Workers' agreements
with the Winery Employers Association of California), and single—
establishment agreements (such as the Machinist's agreements with Morse
Chain). The average number of workers covered by each contract is
13,000.
The contract sample is "unbalanced" in the sense that there are
different numbers of contracts for each bargaining pair. Contracts in
the textile industry, for example, tend to be short. As a result, there
are an average of 14 contracts per bargaining pair from this Industry
over the 24-year sample period. Most contracts in the transportation
equipment industry, on the other hand, run for three years. As a
result, there are approximately eight contracts for each bargaining pair
in the sample from this industry.
In addition to fixed—duration noncontingent contracts, the sample
contains a variety of alternative contract forms, Including
fixed-duration contracts with contingent cost-of-living wage adjustment
formulas (approximately 25 percent of the sample), contracts with sche-
duled wage—reopening provisions (approximately 7.5 percent of the
sample), and contracts with contingent wage reopening provisions
(approximately 1 percent of the sample). Since wage—reopenings place
the parties at risk of a strike, I have defined each reopening as a new
contract. The impact of repener clauses on strike probabilities is—4—
analyzed in the next section.
Even in the absence of explicit reopening provisions, most long
term labor contracts can be reopened at any time with the mutual consent
of the parties, and many contracts are automatically extended past their
scheduled expiration date unless one party or the other files a formal
notice of intent to terminate the contract and put the pair at risk of
strike.7— Approximately one percent of contracts in the sample were
reopened earlier than three months before their scheduled expiration
date, and another six percent ran more than three months past their
scheduled expiration date before a new contract was reached or a strike
was declared. While these facts introduce some ambiguity into the
notion of a contract expiration date, I have adopted the convention of
dating expirations by the earlier of the expiration date of the pre-
ceding contract and the actual renegotiation date of the next contract,
as reported in Current Wage Developments.
The third and fourth columns of Table 1 contain information on the
probability and mean duration of strikes by industry. For most of the
contracts in the sample the source of strike information is the contract
listing in Current Wage Developments.J For contract expirations after
1970, however, strike information is also available from an exhaustive
listing of major strikes assembled by Sheena McConnell and Joseph
Tracy.11 McConnell and Tracy's data include local—issue strikes asso-
ciated with the ratification of multi-establishment master contracts, as
well as more widespread disputes. For comparability with the CWD def i—
nition of contract strikes, however, I restricted attention to disputes—5—
involving at least 70 percent of workers covered by each contract.11"
The McConnell-Tracy strike listings contribute an additional 29 strikes
to the 114 strikes reported in Vroman's data for contracts negotiated
after January 1970. These figures suggest that some 20 percent of
strikes associated with contract renegotiations are missing from the CWD
listings. The added strikes are shorter than the strikes in CWD (27
versus 48 days) but are more-or-less evenly distributed over time and
across industries. Assuming that 20 percent of actual strikes are ran-
domly missing from the CWD listing prior to 1970, the true probability
of strikes In the data set is 14.1 percent.
For purposes of a longitudinal analysis, it Is convenient to work
with a fixed number of contract expirations per bargaining pair. To
this end, I have extracted a balanced sample of contracts based on the
six most recent negotiations for each bargaining pair. Strike probabi-
lities and durations for this sample of 1,518 contracts are presented in
the right-hand columns of Table 1. The pattern of strike probabilities
and durations across industries is similar between the total sample and
the balanced subsample, although strike probabilities are somewhat
higher in the subsample. This reflects the fact that the subsample con—
tains relatively fewer contracts from the 1950's and early 1960's, when
strike probabilities were relatively low. By the same token, under-
reporting of strikes is less significant in the subsample, since
relatively fewer of the contract expirations In the subsample occurred
before 1970 (39.7 percent versus 63.2 percent). Assuming that 20 per-
cent of strikes prior to 1970 are unreported, the true probability of—6-
strikes in the balanced sample is 17.8 percent.
The simple averages In Table 1 show considerable variation across
industries in both the probability and duration of strikes. Strikes
are more likely in durable than nondurable manufacturing, and are most
frequent in the rubber and non-electrical machinery industrles)-V
There is a weak positive rank-order correlation across industries bet-
ween strike probabilities and the conditional duration of strikes (.21)
although the correlation falls to zero If the apparel industry is
ignored. The longest strikes are In lumber and wood products, primary
metals, and fabricated metals, while the shortest strikes are in
apparel., petroleum refining, and Instruments.
Some additional insight into the distribution of strike lengths is
provided by Table 2, which gives the weekly settlement rates for 244
strikes drawn from the balanced sample of contract expirations. Over 95
percent of these strikes are settled in 20 weeks or less. The average
weekly settlement rate during the first 20 weeks is 13.8 percent. With
only two exceptions, the individual weekly settlement rates are within
two standard errors of the overall average: the test statistic for the
hypothesis of a constant settlement hazard has a probability value of
about six percent. It should be noted, however, that the number of
strikes after only a few weeks is relatively small. Recent studies by
Kennan (1980. 1985) and Harrison and Stewart (1986), using much larger
sample sizes, conclude that strike settlement rates tend to decrease
with the duration of the strike. While there is no evidence of this
phenomenon in Table 2, It is difficult to draw firm conclusions because—7—
of the relatively small sample size.
The tabulation of strike probabilities by 5—year interval in Table
1 shows considerable time-series variation in aggregate and industry—
specific strike propensities. Figure 1 presents average annual strike
probabilities for 1961—1979 from thebalanced subsample of 1,518
contracts. Actual probabilities and strike durations by year are
recorded in Appendix Table 1. The figure shows both the probability of
strikes associated with contract expirations in each year, and an
adjusted probability that controls for the industry composition of
contract expirations. These adjusted probabilities represent estimated
year effects from a linear probability model that includes two-digit
industry controls. Both series show relatively low strike probabilities
in the early 1960's, followed by sharply higher strike probabilities
from 1965 to 1970, and lower but widely—varying strike probabilities
throughout the 1970's. Since the focus of this paper is on the longitu-
dinal structure of strike activity, in the empirical analysis reported
below I control for time-varying aggregate strike propensities with a
series of year-effects. Experiments with both ordinary and fixed—effect
probability models suggest that the time-varying component of strike
activity is well represented by a simple four-step function, with steps
at 1965, 1971, and 1975. In particular, this function captures the
relatively low strike probabilities observed in the early 1960's, and
the relatively high strike probabilities from 1965 to l970.!1
III. The Effects of Contract Characteristics on Strike Incidence
In this section I analyze the effects of three characteristics of-8-
collective bargaining agreements on the probability of strikes: the
seasonal timing of contract expirations; the provision for a limited
contract reopening; and the length of time between successive nego-
tiations. Estimation of the effects of contract characteristics on the
probability of strikes is complicated by the nonrandom incidence of
these characteristics across industries and bargaining pairs. The fact
that strike probabilities are relatively low among contracts that expire
in December, for example, does not imply that a bargaining pair who tra-
ditionally negotiate in June could reduce the probability of a work
stoppage by scheduling their negotiations in December. To control for
unobserved heterogeneity in strike propensities across bargaining pairs,
I use three alternative estimation strategies. The first strategy is to
model heterogeneity across industries using a series of two—digit
industry effects. The second estimation strategy is a conditional
logistic regression-—the direct analogue of a fixed effects estimator
for logistic probability models. The third strategy is a first-
differenced version of the linear probability model. In all cases, the
empirical analysis accounts for random under-reporting of strikes among
expirations prior to 1970.
a. Seasonality of Expirations
It is widely acknowledged that there is a strong seasonal pattern
in measures of aggregate strike activity.14'Only recently, however,
has it been possible to decompose this pattern of seasonality into the
seasonal component of expirations, and the seasonal component of strike
probabilities.'Evidence in Gramm (1987, Table 3) based on a large—9—
sample of manufacturing and nonmanufacturing contracts suggests that
monthly strike probabilities vary widely. Her data analysis does not
address the question of whether this seasonal variation is due to the
monthly composition of contract expirations, however, or to an intrinsic
seasonal effect. Indeed, the year—to--year variation in relative monthly
strike probabilities in Gramm's data suggests that compositional effects
may be an important component of seasonal variation in strike
probabilities
In an effort to isolate intrinsic seasonal variation in strike pro-
babilities, Table 3 presents estimated month effects from several models
that control for the composition of expirations. For reference, the
first two columns of the Table report the fraction of expirations in
each month and the associated raw strike probabilities. Column (3) of
Table 3 reports estimated month effects from a benchmark logistic
regression model with no controls for heterogeneity. In order to incor—
porate the assumption that 20 percent of strikes associated with expira-
tions before 1970 are unreported, I assume that the probability of an
observed strike is
(1) pit (1 —.2Dit)jt
where is the predicted probability of a strike in the tth nego—
tiation for the i' pair in the absence of any under-reporting, and
Dit is an indicator variable for expirations prior to January 1970.
The probability of a dispute in the absence of under-reporting is given
by the usual logistic regression formula
(2) 1ogit(p) log(p/(l — = xit-10—
where Xit represents a vector of month effects, with the normalization
that the effect for January Is zero.
The estimates In column (3) show significantly different strike
probabilities depending on the expiration month of the preceding
contract. The likelihood—ratio test associated with the hypothesis that
strike probabilities are constant across months is reported in the last
row of the table, and is highly significant.
The fourth column of Table 3 introduces two-digit industry controls
and a four—step function of time as additional covariates of strike
activity.11" Comparing the estimates in the third and fourth columns of
the table, there are only small differences between the estimated month
effects. These results suggest that the monthly pattern of strike
probabilities is not simply an artifact of the industry distribution of
contract expirations. In fact, the monthly pattern of strike probabili-
ties is very similar with and without industry controls.
The fifth column of Table 3 contains estimated month effects from a
conditional logit model of strike incidence.' This model permits a
separate fixed effect for each bargaining pair in the data set.
Specifically, the probability of a strike for the ith bargaining pair
at the tth negotiation is assumed to be given by•
(3) logit(p) =a1
+x1
where represents a vector of year and month effects and a1
represents a fixed pair-effect. As a consequence of the functional form
of the logistic probability model, the pair-effects are eliminated by—11—
considering the likelihood of the sequence of strike indicators for the
1th bargaining pair(y.1 y p...Y16)conditional on the
total number of strikes observed for the pair in the sample. Since the
number of strikes is a sufficient statistic for the pair—effect in the
logistic probability model, conditioning eliminates the pair-effect from
the likelihood, while permitting estimation of the coefficients asso-
ciated with the time-varying determinants of strike probabilit1es.1/
Unfortunately the addition of the simple under—reporting model
described by equation (I) to the strike probability model (3) leads to a
probability model for observed strike outcomes that no longer satisfies
the necessary conditions for the conditional logit model. The fixed—
effects specification can be combined with an approximation to the
under—reporting model, however, that leads to a workable conditional
likelihood.1 I have therefore used this approximate correction for
under—reporting of strikes prior to 1970 to compute the estimates in
column (5) of Table 3. These estimates are less precise than the con-
ventional logit estimates in column (4), and indicate a somewhat dif-
ferent seasonal pattern. The conditional logit estimates, in fact,
suggest that the monthly effects can be divided Into just two 'seasons":
a low strike probability season from December to May, and a high strike
probability season from June to November. The likelihood ratio test for
the hypothesis that strike probabilities are constant from December to
May, and from June to November, has a marginal significance level of .38.
The estimated month effect for June—November in this simple two—season
model is .96, with a standard error of .28. Assuming an average strike—12—
probability of 15 percent, this implies a 12 percentage point difference
In strike probabilities between expirations in summer and fall, on one
hand, and winter and spring, on the other
The conditional logit estimation scheme relies very heavily on the
functional form of the logistic distribution function. As a check on




where,as before, a1 represents a permanent pair-effect and xjt
represents a vector of year and month effects. Although this specifica-
tion suffers from the objection that the predicted probabilities can lie
outside the unit Interval, it is particularly convenient for handling




where = —Y111represents the change in strike outcomes bet-
ween the (t_l)8t andtth negotiation, Ax1 =xit
—x_repre-
sents the vector of differences in the covariates, and can be
interpreted as a residual. This flrst-differenced linear probability
model can also be combined very easily with the under-reporting model
of equation (l).' The results of this combined model are presented in
column (6) of Table 2. To make the estimates comparable with the esti-
mated coefficients of the logistic regression models, the month-effects
and their standard errors have been multiplied by a factor of-13-
((1 - , where represents the sample average strike probabi-
lity. Assuming .145 ,thenormalizing factor in column (6) is 8.0.
The estimated month effects from the linear probability model are
generally similar to the estimates from the conditional logit model,
although the point estimates for March, May, August and December differ
somewhat between the two specifications. A test that the month effects
from the linear probability specification are constant from December to
May and from June to November has a marginal significance level of .37
(virtually identical to the significance level of the test on the con-
ditional logit coefficients). Assuming a two—season model, the linear
probability specification implies a 15 percentage point increase in the
probability of strikes between June and November relative to expirations
in December—May, with a standard error of .05.
Both the conditional logit and flrst—differenced linear probability
specifications therefore indicate that strike probabilities are signifi-
cantly higher in summer and fall relative to expirations between
December and May. Since both specifications control for bargaining—
pair specific heterogeneity, these results suggest that contract nego-
tiators can vary the likelihood of subsequent work stoppages by varying
the expiration dates of their contracts. There is, on the other hand,
no evidence that the duration of strikes varies by the expiration date
of the previous contract." These findings raise an interesting
puzzle: Why do negotiators schedule expirations in high strike probabi-
lity months? The interpretation of strikes as unproductive accidents
(Reder and Neumann (1980), Addison and Siebert (1981)) implies that-14—
bargainers should schedule negotiations when the expected costs due to
work stoppages are lowest. Assuming that marginal strike costs do not
vary by season, the results in Table 3 clearly reject this interpreta-
tion. More detailed evidence on the seasonal variation In strike
costs, however, is obviously required for a definitive test.
b. Reopeners and Contract Duration
Table 4 presents estimates of the effects of two additional
contract characteristics on strike probabilities: the length of time
since the last negotiation; and the provision for a limited contract
reopening. As is the case for the expiration month, both of these
characteristics are determined in the preceding contract negotiation.
Time since the last negotiation is simply the duration of the preceding
contract. A limited reopening, on the other hand, is a provision of the
previous contract that restricts negotiations at a future date to a spe-
cific set of contract issues, with the understanding that other aspects
of the collective agreement are to remain unchanged.' Evidence that
either of these characteristics affect strike probabilities again
suggests that the bargaining parties can control the likelihood of sub-
sequent disputes, and raises the question of how the parties choose
among the menu of contract alternatives.
The estimates in Table 4 are obtained from models that exclude
seasonal effects, although as a practical matter the estimates are not
much different when seasonal effects are included, since the distribu-
tion of reopening provisions and contract lengths is more—or-less inde-
pendent of expiration month. The first row of the table presents the-15—
estimated coefficient of a dummy variable for a limited reopening.1
The second row presents the estimated coefficient of the duration (in
months) of the previous contract. In cases where new contract or a
strike was reached prior to the expiration date of the preceding
contract, the duration of the previous contract is defined as the period
of time between its effective date and the date of the next contract or
strike.
The first column of the table contains the estimated effects of
these two variables with no heterogeneity controls. The estimates show
that strike probabilities are significantly lower in reopening
situations, and significantly higher following the expiration of a
longer contract.afi" The second column introduces two—digit industry
controls and a step-function of time Into the logistic regression. The
estimated effect of a limited reopening is unchanged, while the effect
of previous contract duration is reduced slightly. Finally, the two
right-hand columns of Table 4 present alternative fixed-effects
estimators of the impact of reopening provisions and contract length on
strike probabilities. The estimated contract length effects are similar
to the estimates with industry-level controls, while the estimated
effects of reopening provisions are smaller, particularly in the first-
differenced linear probability specification. The point estimates imply
that strike probabilities are 9—11 percent lower in reopening
situations, and about six percent higher for negotiations following a
three-year, as compared to a two-year contract.-''
These results suggest two conclusions. First, the commitment to-16—
limited negotiations implied by a reopener clause actually reduces the
probability of disputes. Second, increases in contract length, while
reducing the number of opportunities for disputes, lead to a higher
probability of disputes in each negotiation. in fact, the estimates in
Table 4 suggest that the expected number of disputes per period of time
is approximately constant, whether bargaining occurs at one—two-- or
three-year intervals .
Thefinding that expected strike losses per year are independent of
contract length yields some support for the "accident" interpretation of
strikes. On the margin, there is apparently no advantage to shortening
or lengthening contract duration in order to avoid costly work stop-
pages. The findings that strike probabilities increase with contract
duration and decrease in reopener situations are also roughly consistent
with the notion that strike probabilities increase with the degree of
uncertainty associated with the bargainers' information about each
other. Complex multiple—issue negotiations require detailed information
on the parties' tradeoffs between alternative forms of compensation.
Single—issue negotiations over wages, on the other hand, are closer to a
zero-sum bargaining game. This characterization suggests that disputes
arising out of imperfect information are less likely to occur in typical
reopening situations. By the same token, it may be reasonable to assume
that the parties' information about each other decays with the length of
time since their most recent contract negotiations. The positive rela-
tion between contract length and strike probabilities is therefore con-
sistent with increasing uncertainty associated with less frequent
negotiations.—17--
IV. The Longitudinal Structure of Strike Activity
a. Models of Strike Incidence
This section presents and analyzes the pattern of strike incidence
over time within bargaining pairs. Using information on six contract
negotiations for each bargaining pair, I first test the hypothesis that
strike probabilities are related to previous strike incidence. Contrary
to the findings of Mauro (1982) and Schnell and Gramin (1987), there is
no evidence of either positive or negative state dependence in strike
incidence, controlling for heterogeneity in underlying strike propen—
sities. The absence of state dependence in strike incidence, however,
masks an important dependence of strike probabilities on the duration of
lagged strike outcomes. Specifically, I find that strike probabilities
are significantly increased by a relatively short strike in the preceding
negotiation, and significantly reduced by a relatively long strike in
the preceding negotiation.
Some simple evidence on the extent of state—dependence In strike
incidence is presented in Table 5. This table presents a frequency
distribution of the alternative strike histories represented in the
sample of six negotiations for each of the 253 bargaining pairs,
together with the predicted frequencies generated by two simple models
of strike incidence. The first column of the Table describes the rele-
vant strike history: the strike history "000000", for example, repre—
sents the occurrence of no strikes in six negotiations. The next column
gives the number of bargaining pairs with each history. For simplicity,
I have not displayed the actual distributions of bargaining pairs among-18—
histories with three or four strikes in six negotiations. Since strikes
are relatively rare events, the number of pairs in the individual cells
with more than three strikes is typically one or zero. There are no
pairs with five strikes in six negotiations, and only one pair (the
Autoworkers and Allis Chalmers) with six strikes.
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 present the predicted num-
bers of bargaining pairs with each strike history (or group of
histories) from two alternative models: an ordinary logistic regression
model of strike incidence with industry and year effects; and a con-
ditional logit model with year effects.V Both of these models are
estimated under the assumption of no state-dependence in strike inci-
dence. A comparison of the predicted frequencies under these simple
models to the actual frequencies of the alternative strike histories
therefore provides a simple test for the presence of state-dependence.
A comparison of the actual cell frequencies to the predicted fre—
quencies generated by the ordinary logit model with year and industry
effects suggests that the model does a relatively good of predicting the
various alternatives. The absolute t—statistics for the difference
between the predicted and actual cell frequencies are presented in
parentheses beside each predicted cell frequency, and an overall
goodness—of-fit statistic is presented in the last row of the table."
Apart from the cells with no strikes and six strikes, and the "000011'
cell, the individual t—statistics are relatively small. There is very
little evidence that the model systematically over- or under-predicts
cells associated with significant state-dependence effects. For-19—
example, negative state dependence (as reported by Mauro (1982) and
Schnell and Gramm(1987))would show up in this table as significant
over—prediction of cells with two consecutive strikes. The results in
rows 9-13, on the other hand, show a tendency to underpredict these
cells, at least among histories with two strikes in six negotiations.
A similar conclusion emerges from an examination of the goodness—
of—fit of the conditional logit model. By construction, the conditional
logit model fits the number of observations with each strike total
exactly. Looking at the individual strike histories, the only signi-
ficant outlier under the conditonal logit specification is the "000011"
history: otherwise, the goodness—of—fit to the individual cells and the
overall table are acceptable by conventional standards.J.' Again, the
fit of the model does not Indicate any significant state-dependence in
strike incidence.
A close inspection of the individual strike histories, however,
suggests that the absence of state dependence in strike incidence is the
product of two offsetting effects: a tendency for increased strike
probabilities following relatively short disputes; and a tendency for
reduced strike probabilities following relatively long disputes. Some
simple evidence is presented In Table 6, which describes the probability
and duration of strikes conditional on the length of the preceding
strike. The first row of the table reveals a sharp difference between
the effects of shorter strikes and longer strikes on the probability of
subsequent disputes. In contrast to this finding, a simple model of
state-dependence implies that the probability of a subsequent dispute-20-
depends only on the occurrence of a strike, and not on its length.
Despite the variation in strike probabilities by lagged strike length,
however, the mean strike durations in the second row of Table 6 show no
significant variation by lagged strike length.
In order to investigate the apparent dependence of strike proba-
bilities on lagged strike outcomes, a statistical model is required that
permits both unobserved heterogeneity in strike propensities and poten-
tial state—dependence in consecutive strike outcomes. A convenient
model is a random-effects logit specification
(5) logit (p) =a1
+Xjt
+'5kt—i '
wherep represents the probability of a strike at the tth nego-
tiation for the th bargaining pair in the absence of under—reporting,
Xit represents a vector of time—effects, is an indicator for a
strike in the kth duration class in the preceding negotiation, and
a1 represents a randomly distributed individual effect. A simple model
for the distribution of the random—effects is a point-mass distribution
with a small number of mass_points.V The mass—points and associated
probabilities, together with the parameters •â2,...}canbe
estimated jointly by conventional maximum likelihood techniques,
treating the pre—sample strike outcomes as fixed.'
Estimation results for this random—effects specification are
reported in Table 7.—" For reference, the first column of the table
presents the results of the model with no allowance for lagged strike—21—
effects. The goodness-of—fit statistic reported in the last row of the
table indicates that the random-effects model with a simple two-point
distribution of effects generates a relatively good fit to the table of
strike incidence histories. Relative to a conventional logit model with
two—digit industry effects, for example, the model has 14 fewer para-
meters but generates a slightly better fit to the table of strike
histories. The addition of an extra mass point to the distribution of
random effects yields an Insignificant improvement in the log—likelihood
(from -637.2 to —636.3) and only a slight improvement in the goodness—
of—fit to the table of strike histories.
The second column of the table adds a single parameter for the
change in the log—odds of a strike following a strike in the previous
negotiation. This specification corresponds to a conventional model of
state-dependence. As the results in Table 5 suggest, there is no strong
evidence of state—dependence. The point estimate of the lagged strike
effect is actually positive, consistent with the finding in Table 5 that
consecutive strike outcomes are slightly underpredicted by models with
no allowance for state-dependence.
The models in columns (3)—(6) allow for differential effects of
lagged strikes on future strike probabilities, depending on the duration
of the earlier dispute. As suggested by Table 6, a simple two-outcome
model that distinguishes between 1-14 day strikes, on one hand, and 15
day or longer strikes, on the other, is adequate to describe the data.
Whereas strikes of less than two weeks duration (some 30 percent of all
strikes) significantly increase the probability of a subsequent dispute,—22—
longer strikes actually reduce the probability of a subsequent dispute.
As a check that these results are not biased by imperfect heterogeneity
controls, the model in column (6) of Table 7 introduces a set of grouped
industry effects.In order to reduce the number of parameters in the
model, two—digit industries were grouped according to their estimated
effects in a conventional logit model of strike lncidence. The
results with the grouped industry variables further strengthen the
conclusion that lagged strike outcomes affect current strike probabili-
ties, with shorter strikes increasing the likelihood of future disputes,
and longer strikes reducing the likelihood of future disputes.
b. Models of Strike Incidence and Duration
In view of the impact of strike duration on subsequent strike out-
comes, this section presents a more detailed analysis of the duration
and incidence of strikes over time within bargaining pairs. The
analysis is based on a model that describes strike outcomes in terms of only
three possibilities: no strike; a strike for less than two weeks; and a
strike for longer than two weeks. While this simple three-outcome model
of strike activity is obviously incomplete, the results of the last sec-
tion suggest that the distinction between short and long strikes is very
useful in longitudinal models of strike incidence. The three—outcome
case is therefore a natural starting point for studying the joint
determination of strike incidence and duration over time.
In order to describe the distribution of bargaining outcomes
between no strikes, short strikes, and long strikes, consider a pair of
indicator variables and ZIt ,where =1if a strike occurs
in the tth negotiation for the 1th bargaining pair, and 0 other—-23-
wise,and Zit =1if the strike lasts for longer than two weeks, and
o otherwise. Let and q represent the probability of a strike
and the conditional probability of a long strike, respectively, ignoring









wherea1 and are individual effects and Xit is a vector of
control variates (for example, year and/or industry effects). Finally,
assume that y and z1. are independent, conditional on a1 y1
Xjt ,itl
,andZit_l Theparameters and 2 measure the
effect of a short or long strike in negotiation t-l on the probability
of a strike in negotiation t ."Theparameters P1 and p2 measure
similar effects on the probability of a strike continuing for more than
two weeks.
Given values for cz and 6 ,andpre-sample strike outcomes,
equations (5a) and (5b) can be used to calculate the likelihood of an
observed sequence of strike outcomes over time. The two equations
describe a first-order Markov model of transitions between three alter-
native states: no strikes; strikes of less than 14 days; and strikes of
more than 14 days. Following the approach in the previous section, r
treat the joint distribution of a1 and 6 as a discrete distribution
with a small number (2 or 3) of mass points. I also condition the esti-
mation and inference on the observed strike outcomes for each bargaining—24—
pair in the immediate pre-sample period.
Table 8 presents estimation results for the trinomial outcome model
of strikes implied by equations (5a) and (5b). The first column of the
Table presents estimates based on a two mass—point bivariate distribu-
tion of individual effects. Apart from individual effects, the only
covariates of strike activity are a step—function of time. For simpli-
city, the time effects in equations (5a) (the incidence equation) and
(5b) (the conditional duration equation) are restricted to be propor-
tional: e = .Theestimated proportionality constant is
reported in the fifth row of the table.
The estimated effects of previous work stoppages on the probability
of a strike are presented in the first two rows of the table. The point
estimates are very similar to the estimates in Table 7, with about the
same level of precision. The estimated effects of short and long stri-
kes in the preceding contract on the conditional probability of a long
strike in the current negotiation are reported in the third and fourth
rows of Table 8. The point estimates suggest that a long strike is more
likely if there was a long strike in the previous contract, and less
likely of the previous contract settle peacefully, although the
estimates are relatively imprecise.
The second column of the table presents estimation results for a
three mass—point model of the distribution of individual effects.
Overall, the results are very similar to the two mass-point specifica-
tion, and the likelihood of the sample is not significantly improved.
The hypothesis that lagged strikes do not affect the probability of-25—
short or long strikes is addressed in the third column of the table.
Comparing the likelihood and parameter estimates to those in the second
column, there is very little evidence against the hypothesis. While
lagged strike activity apparently influences the probability of sub-
sequent strikes, the probability of continuing a strike beyond two weeks
is not much affected by previous strike outcomes. Some caution is
nevertheless required in interpreting these results, since the number of
strikes in the data set is small, and strike duration Is apparently a
noisy phenomenon.' A larger data set is probably required to fully
analyze the determinants of strike duration, and particularly the
effects of lagged duration on current strike durations.V
The fourth column of the table presents estimates for a two mass—
point specification that includes grouped industry effects as well as
time covariates in equations (5a) and (Sb). Here I have restricted the
time effects and industry effects to be proportional in the two
equations, but I have allowed different factors of proportionality for
the two types of effects. While the time effects are significant in the
duration equation, the industry effects, which play a strong role in the
strike probability equation, have very little effect on duration. As
in Table 7, the addition of grouped industry effects increases the abso-
lute value of the estimated effect of a longer strike in the preceding
negotiation. Overall, the estimates for the incidence equation imply
that strike probabilities increase 10—12 percentage points following a
relatively short strike, and decrease 6-9 percentage points following a
longer work stoppage. The estimates for the duration equation, while-26-
relatively imprecise, indicate that previous strike outcomes do not
effect the relative likelihood of short or longdisputes.4'
These findings are consistent with a very simple dynamic model in
which the probability of strikes depends positively on a state variable
whose value is unaffected by short strikes but is significantly reduced
by the occurrence of a long dispute.4V In such a model, the occurrence
of a short strike signals a high level of the state variable, and an
increased probability of further strikes. The occurrence of a long
strike, on the other hand, reduces the probability of further strikes by
reducing the level of the state variable. There are a variety of
interpretations of the state variable in such a model: as an index of
union members' wealth for example; or alternatively, as a general index
of worker discontent. In the absence of more complete information,
however, it is impossible to distinguish between these various
interpretations.
The pattern of state dependence in strike probabilities also bears
an interesting relation to the literature on judging winners and losers
of strikes. Studies from a number of different countries and time
periods have concluded that unions are more likely to win short strikes
than long ones.4--" If the impression of union victory is related to the
union's willingness to engage in subsequent work stoppages, then this
pattern of wins and losses by strike duration is consistent with the
pattern of state dependence observed in Tables 7 and 8.
V. Conclusions
This paper has present evidence on two aspects of strike activity—27—
associated with the renegotiation of union contracts: the effects of
endogenously—determined contract characteristics on the probability
of disputes; and the effects of lagged strike outcomes on future strike
incidence and duration. Although the evidence is based on a relatively
small sample of bargaining pairs drawn mainly from the manufacturing
sector, the findings suggest a number of conclusions and avenues for
further research.
First, strike probabilities are significantly affected by contract
characteristics determined in earlier negotiations. Strikes are more
likely following a longer contract than a shorter one, and are less
likely in limited reopening situations. Strike probabilities are also
affected by the expiration month of the preceding contract, with expira-
tions in summer and fall leading to an increased likelihood of disputes.
The effects of contract duration and reopening provisions are poten-
tially consistent with the hypothesis that strike probabilities increase
with increases In the bargainer's uncertainty about each other.
Uncertainty may be expected to increase with the length of time between
negotiations and decrease when bargaining is restricted to a smaller
number of issues. The effect of the monthly timing of negotiations is
less easily explained. Judging by the duration of disputes, marginal
strike costs are not much different in summer and fall than in winter
and spring. A simple model of negotiator behavior based on the
hypothesis that the parties try to minimize expected losses due to work
stoppages cannot readily explain the predominance of scheduled expira-
tions in high strike probability months.-28-
Second, strike probabilities are significantly affected by pre-
ceding strike outcomes. Relative to strike probabilities after a peace-
ful settlement of the most recent contract negotiation, strike
probabilities are 10 percentage points higher if the contract was
settled after a l—to-l4 day strike, and 5—7 percentage points lower if
the contract was settled after a longer work stoppage. The effects of
previous strike outcomes on subsequent strike durations are less preci-
sely estimated and are not significantly different between negotiations
that ended peacefully and those that ended in shorter or longer strikes.
This pattern of state dependence Is not consistent with the simple
model of learning proposed by Schnell and Gramm (l987).1 Rather, it
suggests that any dynamic model of strike propensities must carefully
distinguish between the effects of relatively short strikes, on one
hand, and longer strikes, on the other. It also suggests that one
should distinguish between disputes of various lengths in investigating
the effects of strikes on other aspects of the collective bargaining
agreement, including wage outcomes.—29—
Footnotes
*1 am grateful to Wayne Vroman for making available his contract
data, and to Sheena McConnell and Joe Tracy for access to their data on
strikes. Thanks to John Abowd, Rebecca Blank, George Jakubson, and
Robert Topel for comments on earlier drafts.
1/
Recent studies include papers by Gramm (1986, 1987), Gunderson,
Kervin, and Reid (1986), McConnell (1986), Schnell and Gramm (1987),
Tracy (1986, 1987), and S. Vroman (1986). Earlier studies include
Farber (1978), Mauro (1982), and Swidinsky and Vanderkamp (1982). Much
of the recent empirical and theoretical literature on strikes is sum-
marized by Kennan (1986).
L"Among the aggregate studies arepapers by Ashenfelter and
Johnson (1969), Pencavel (1970), Kaufman (1982) and Abbott (1984).
_h/Mauro (1982) and Schnell and Gramm(1987) both report evidence
that strike probabilities are reduced following a strike in the previous
negotiation.
am grateful to Wayne Vroman for making this data available.
A further description of the sample is presented in W. Vroman (1982).
5/ . .. — Thenonmanufacturing bargaining pairs are: Class I Railroads
and the Railroad Engineers; Class I Railroads and the Brotherhood of
Railroad and Airline Clerks; Trucking Employers Incorporated and the
Teamsters (National Master Freight Agreement); New York Shipping
Association and the Longshoremen; Pacific Maritime Association and the
Longshoremen; United Airlines and the Machinists; and ATT (Longlines
Division) and the Communication Workers.
reopening clause states that the parties will open an ongoing
agreement for purposes of renegotiating a limited number of Contract—30—
issues (often only wages): see the Bureau of National Affairs (1986,
section 36.2). Most reopener clauses in the sample specify a fixed date
for reopening. A small number specify reopening contingent on a speci-
fic event (for example, discontinuation of wage and price controls; wage
adjustments in contracts at other firms; inflation rates above a certain
maximum).
the Bureau of National Affairs (1986, section 36.2). A
small number of contracts in the sample from the textile industry spe-
cify an indefinite contract duration, although these contracts all
reopened at regular 12 or 24 month intervals.
interesting issue for further research is the question of
when and why the parties continue to operate under the terms of the old
contract.
The original source of the strike information in CWD is the
contract report filed by firms at the request of the BLS, in connection
with their ongoing analysis of wage changes in contracts with 1,000 or
more workers. For contracts negotiated between 1960 and 1970 I checked
the CWD strike information against contract information reported in the
Monthly Labor Review's monthly summary of recent developments in
industrial relations. I found only three examples of strikes reported
in the Review that were not recorded In CWD.
-"McConnell and Tracy's strike listings were assembled from three
sources: a weekly BLS in-house newsletter entitled "Industrial
Relations Facts"; a BLS data tape listing strikes recorded from
published newspaper reports; and a Bureau of National Affairs' data tape-31—
listing strikes from published media and other sources. The Bureau of
National Affairs' data is only available after 1970: for this reason,
McConnell and Tracy began their merged strike listings in that year. A
further description of their data is provided by McConnell (1986).
•111The precise definition of a strike in Current Wage Developments
is unclear.It is clear, however, that the BLS does not report local-
issue strikes in CWD. The question of whether local-issue strikes
should be treated differently from more general disputes in an important
issue for further research.
--Industry average strike probabilities from larger samples of
agreements are presented by McConnell (1986) and Gramm (1987).
McConnell's data includes 4,592 agreements in the manufacturing sector
from the period 1970-81. Granun's data includes 3,812 agreements from
the period 1971-80. The correlation coefficients between the industry
strike probabilities in the fifth column of Table 1 and those presented
by McConnell and Gramm are .91 and .73 respectively.
-Susan Vroman (1986) has investigated the effects of a variety of
macroeconomic variables on the probability of strikes in this data set.
Her results suggest that unemployment rates, past inflation rates, and
wage and price controls all effect the probability of strikes. She does
not, however, compare the explanatory power of her probit regressions to
regressions with unrestricted year effects. The likelihood ratio test
statistic of the four-step time function against an unrestricted speci—
ficatiori of the year effects in a logistic regression that includes
2—digit industry effects has a probability value of 16 percent.—32—
-"Kennan (1986, Section 11) provides a brief summary of the evi-
dence on seasonality, starting with the study by Yoder (1938).
-"Aggregate measures of strike incidence or duration include
intra-contract strikes. Evidence reported by Flaherty (1983) shows that
these strikes also have a seasonal pattern.
1'For example, the rank-order correlation between monthly strike
probabilities in two consecutive years in Gramm's data is typically less
than .25, and is in many cases negative.
main effect of the adjustment for unreported strikes is to
change the estimated year effects in the specification for p*jt ,the
probability of strikes in the absence of under-reporting. Comparing
estimated logistic regression models that include industry effects and
time-period effects with and without the correction of under-reporting
prior to 1970, the year effects for time periods before 1970 are .20 to
.25 higher in the corrected model. The industry effects are very simi-
lar between specifications.
18/ . . . . — Thismodel is described in Chamberlain (1980), who also provides
references to earlier work.
-Note that bargaining pairs who never strike, or who strike in
every negotiation, do not contribute to the conditionallikelihood.-33—
"Specifically, I consider the approximate formula for the proba-





where y =.256is chosen to approximate the behavior of the true model
at the sample mean strike probability. This model is clearly amenable
to a conditional likelihood formulation.The approximation is also
relatively precise, at least for values of the individual effects that
give rise to predicted strike probabilities between 2 and 30 percent.
VThe combined linear-probability and under—reporting model
Implies that the probability of an observed strike is
=(1—
.2D1t)(a +x1t)
where Dt is an indicator for expirations prior to 1970. A suitable
regression equation for observed strike outcomes is
yit yit-l ________- __________ = x. +
1—. 2D.t 1 —.2Djt_j
itit
whereit is a residual with expected value equal to 0 .Notethat
it is conditionally heteroskedastic. The standard errors for the dif—
ferenced linear probability model are therefore estimated by the White
(1980) procedure.
'The mean and median duration for strikes associated with expira-
tions between December and May are 45.3 and 28, respectively. The mean
and median duration for strikes associated with expirations between June
and November are 45.4 and 28, respectively.-34—
'In an effort to check if seasonality in strike probabilities
varies significantly by region, I fit separate first-differenced linear
probability models of strike incidence to 61 bargaining pairs in
Southern and Western states and 99 pairs in Northern states (the
remaining bargaining situations are multi—state). Neither subsample
rejected a two-season model based on December-May and June-November.
The estimated increase in the probability of strikes for expiration in
June-November was 13 percentage points for the Northern pairs, and 23
percentage points for the Southern-Western pairs, with standard errors
of 8 percent and 9 percent, respectively.
"According to the Bureau of National Affairs (1986, Section
36.2), most reopening provisions are limited to wages, fringe benefits,
and cost—of-living wage adjustments. The courts have ruled that a
reopening agreement limited to "wages" does not preclude negotiation
over "compensation" more broadly defined. See Meltzer (1977),
pp. 712—718.
have counted as "reopenings" only those negotiations that are
Identified as reopening in the preceding contract, and whose reopening
date is specified in the preceding contract. By this definition, the
data set contains 91 reopeners (6 percent of contract negotiations),
mostly In textile, apparel, and chemical Industries.
probability of strikes among reopenings is two percent.
Strike probabilities by the duration of the preceding contract are as
follows: less than 18 months——7.ll percent; 18 to 29 inonths—--9.93 per-
cent; 30 to 41 months—-20.91 percent; and 42 months and longer—-29.73
percent.-35-
have also estimated the effect of previous contract length by
grouping contracts into one-year (less than 18 months), two-year (18 to
29 months), three—year (30 to 41 months) and longer (over 42 months)
contracts. Relative to a one-year contract, the estimated effects and
associated standard errors from a differenced linear probability model
are: two-year contract -.01 (.03); three-year contract .06 (.03); four-
year or longer contract .26 (.09).
"For example, the average probability of strikes among two-year
(i.e., 19-32 month) contracts is approximately 10 percent. The expected
number of disputes per year on a two-year bargaining cycle is therefore
.05. The estimates in Table 4 suggest that the probabilities of strikes
in one— and three-year bargaining cycles are 4 and 16 percent, respec-
tively. These probabilities imply .04 and .053 expected disputes per
year, bargaining annually and triennially. Mean strike duration
following a one-year contract is slightly shorter than mean strike dura-
tion following two- or three—year contracts: 32.5 versus 45.6 and 46.8
days, respectively.
'The models incorporate the corrections for under—reporting of
strikes prior to 1970 discussed in the preceding section.
30/ .. . . — Thet—statistics and the overall goodness—of—fit statistic are
not corrected for the estimation of the industry and year effects in the
logit model. A suitable correction is suggested by Heckman (1984) (see
also Moore (1977). The impact of this correction on the individual t-
statistics in column (3) of Table 5 is trivial. The overall goodness—-36-
of—fit statistic, however, increases to 83.55 (with a probability value
of .04) when this correction is applied. The derivation of the
corrected and uncorrected goodness—of-fit statistics is described in an
earlier version of this paper (Card (1986)).
eight bargaining pairs with the "000011" strike history are
apparently unrelated (i.e., are drawn from different industries and dif-
ferent time periods).
similar model was proposed by Card and Sullivan (1987) as a
description of individual employment probabilities.
"Ignoring under-reporting, the probability that the 1tti pair
has a sequence of strike indicators (y1 ,y2,...y6)
,conditionalon
the strike outcome in the pre-sample negotiation, is
J y l-y
k=lt() (1 pit (ak))
where pt(G) is the probability of a dispute conditional on the indi-
vidual effect, a1 2 ••ajare the mass—points of the distribution
function of a1 ,and are the associated probability weights. In
principle, conditioning the estimation on the distribution of the pre—
sample strike outcomes introduces a bias in the estimation of the para-
meters --seeHeckman (1981). In other work using strike outcomes for
Canadian contracts (Card (1987)), however, I have experimented with
alternative methods of handling the initial conditions and found rela-
tively small differences between them.
likelihood of observed strike outcomes is corrected for 20
percent random under—reporting of strikes prior to 1970. No correction—37—
is made for the effect of under—reporting on the distribution of the
lagged strike outcome indicators.
"The fourgroups are a low strike—probability group (apparel,
lumber and wood), a moderate strike-probability group (primary metals,
fabricated metals, electrical machinery, transportation equipment), a
high strike—probability group (rubber, non-electrical machinery), and a
base group (all other industries).
-The assumption of independence betweeny and z1 is not
particularly restrictive if the distribution of the individual effects
and is flexible.
VIn the event of a short strike in (t—l) , =1and
Zit_l =0 ,soiogit(p) is increased by 81 .Inthe event of a long
strike in t—l and z1_1 =1,sologit(p) is increased by
'For example, the R2 in a regression equation for log strike
duration that includes two-digit industry effects and time variables Is
about 20 percent. The industry effects in such an equation are jointly
significant at only about the 10 percent level.
"The number of consecutive strikes in the data set Is relatively
low: 58 (distributed among 42 bargaining pairs).
"This is consistent with results from a simple cross-sectional
logit model of short and long strike durations. In such a model, none
of the industry effects are individually significant, and the probabi-
lity value of the test for the hypothesis that the Industry effects are-38—
jointly equal to zero is .12.
4-1"Some additional evidence on the weak relation between lagged
strike outcomes and strike durations is provided by the pattern of
average strike durations by the number of strikes in six negotiations.
These average durations are 52 days for one strike; 40 days for two
strikes; 45 days for three strikes; 56 days for four strikes; and 16
days for six strikes.
'suppose for example that the occurrence of a strike is governed
by a latent variable t = + ut,wherew represents the state
variable and Ut represents an error term. Suppose further that Wt




measures the effect of a dispute on the state variable and Vt is
another error term. Finally, suppose that costs are measured by strike
length and that strike duration is a random variable equal to 1 with
probability q and k (0 < k < 1) with probability 1 -q .Under
suitable assumptions this model generates a steady—state transition
matrix in which lagged short strikes increase the probability of future
strikes and lagged long strikes reduce the probability of future
strikes.
4'This literature is reviewed by Kennan (1986), pp. 1113—1114.
For example, H. Moore (1911, p. 119) presents contingency tables
of the union success rate against strike duration for disputes in
Germany (from 1899 to 1905) and France (from 1890 to 1905). Both tables
show declining union success rates with the length of the strike.
have also found a similar pattern of state dependence among
strike outcomes for a sample of over 2,200 collective bargaining agreements
from Canada (Card 1987).-39--
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(Dp,) Overall 1959—U 1965—69 970—74 975—79
1. Food and8svesaes 20 205 8.3 31.0 10.3 0.0 17.2 12.0 6.9 34.2
2. Tobacco 3 24 12.5 27.0 16.7 0.0 75.0 0.0 0.0 27.0
3. TextileMills 13 185 4.9 20.2 7.7 0.0 11.1 15.8 2.6 13.8
4. Apparel 13 118 1.7 7.0 2.6 0.0 3.9 4.6 0.0 7.0
5. Luiberand 88 a.a 79.7 3.7 0.0 5.6 5.9 0.0 59.0
6.Furniture S 41 14.6 15.3 20.0 0.0 14.3 50.0 0.0 15.3
7. Paper 19 22? 6.1 62.3 7.9 0.0 6.1 4.7 15.1 58.8
8.Printing 6 48 8.3 36.3 8.3 0.0 15.4 0.0 12.5 43.0
9.Che.ica!s 21 242 10.3 56.9 14.3 0.0 20.0 19.6 7.5 U.4
10.Petrleu. 4 56 10.7 17.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
11. Rubber 7 73 27.4 56.6 40.516.7 35.7 58.3 40.0 59.8
12. Leather 5 45 0.0 ——— 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
13.Glass 22 215 8.8 42.7 12.1 0.0 24.6 7.5 9.4 40.7
14. Priuary Metals 17 165 19.4 89.3 18.6 10.0 24.1 18.8 19.1 92.3
15.FabricatedMetals 14 131 19.9 76.5 25.0 29.4 28.6 28.0 14.3 40.9
14.Machinvy 14 126 29.8 33.1 38.1 21.4 40.0 62.9 41.2 25.3
(nan—electrical)
17.Electrical 24 203 16.8 U.? 20.8 9.7 22.5 23.9 25.9 48.6
Machiooi'
15. Trp,port.tisn 24 200 20.5 42.3 24.3 14.3 32.5 16.3 33.3 42.1
tquipuent
19.Instru.ents 4 54 3.7 12.5 8.3 0.0 20.0 8.3 0.0 12.5
20.Mlscellaneeui 2 27 0.0 — 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Menutacturn
21. Tranipertatin 7 70 18.5 32.1 23.4 33.3 16.7 12.5 45.5 35.7
andUtilities
22. All industries 253 2543 12.6 49.4 16.1 10.0 20.8 16.3 13.9 45.7
Mote:Data source ii described in text. Strikes includestrikes tro. Current Wage
Dev.lop.ents andstrikesadded frogMcConnell-Tracystrike listings.Table 2
Empirical Hazard Rate of Strike Settlement'
Notes: 1Calculated from 244 strikes from last six
contracts for each bargaining pair. After
20 weeks there were 12 strikes in progress.
T—ratio for the hypothesis that the weekly
hazard rate is equal to the average hazard
rate over the first 20 weeks (13.8 percent).
The chi-squared test that all 20 hazard
rates are equal is 29.58 with a marginal
significance level of 5.8 percent.
Number of Fraction 1-Ratio for
Week Ongoing Settled Testof Constant
Strikes in Week Hazardb/
1 244 0.127 -0.50
2 213 0.197 2.50









6 101 0.069 -2.00
7 94 0.117 —0.59
8 83 0.169 0.81
9 69 0.159 0.52
10 58 0.086 -1.14
11 53 0.189 1.07
12 43 0.070 —1.30
13 40 0.275 2.51
14 29 0.069 —1.08
15 27 0.111 —0.41
16 24 0.042 —1.37
17 23 0.130 —0.11
18 20 0.200 0.80
19 16 0.125 —0.15
20 14 0.143 0.05Table 3









































































































































Notes: !"Based on last six contracts for each bargaining pair. Sample size is 1518.
"Estimated month effects from logit regression with and without controls for two—digit
industry and time periods.
"Estimated month effects fro• conditional logit regression with approximate correction for
unreported strikes prior to 1970. See text.
"Normalized estimated month effects from first—differenced linear probability model.
Standard errors and exclusion test statistic are corrected for heteroskedasticitY. The
estimates represent the actual estimates multiplied by 8, and are directly comparable with
the estimates obtained from the logit specifications.
"Likelihood ratio test for exclusion of month effects. The test statistic has 11 degrees
of freedom. For the linear probability model, the test statistic is a Wald test that the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Actual and Predicted Strike Histories:














1. 000000 118 105.8 (3.07) 118 (-—
ke
2. 100000 12 10.7 .43 8.1 (1.49)
3. 010000 8 13.3 (1.56) 9.9 (.66)
4. 001000 17 17.3 (.09) 15.6 (.42)
5. 000100 9 13.9 (1.41) 10.8 (.59)
6. 000010 9 12.0 (.95) 10.20 (.41)
7. 000001 ii 13.4 (.81) 11.49 (.41)
8. Total 6 cases 66 80.7 (2.20) 66.0 (-—
2Strikes
9. 110000 1 2.17 (.82) 1.6 (.49)
10. 011000 5 3.6 (.80) 3.1 (1.11)
11. 001100 3 4.2 (.61) 4.3 (.66)
12. 000110 2 2.9 (.53) 2.6 (.39)
13. 000011 8 2.7 (3.34) 2.4 (3.69)
14. 101000 2 2.8 (.48) 2.2 (.11)
15. 010100 1 2.8 (1.08) 2.3 (.88)
16. 001010 2 3.5 (.84) 3.4 (.81)
17. 000101 2 3.2 (.71) 3.0 (.60)
18. 100100 3 2.2 (.52) 1.7 (1.04)
19. 010010 1 2.5 (.95) 2.0 (.75)
20. 001001 4 4.0 (.02) 3.9 (.03)
21. 100010 0 2.0 (1.43) 1.5 (1.23)
22. 010001 2 2.8 (.47) 2.3 (.21)
23.100001 2 2.2 (.15) 1.6 (.28)
24. Total 15 cases 38 43.4 (1.06) 38 (
——
3Strikes
25.Total 20 cases24 17.1 (2.06) 24 (
——
4Strikes
26.Total 15 cases 6 5.0 (.49) 6(
——
5Strikes




1. .1(3.21) 1 (
——






Notes: "Predicted number represents the expected number of
pairs with a given history, conditional on the esti-
mated parameters. The number in parentheses repre-
sents the absolute t—statistic associated with the
test that the predicted and actual number of pairs are
equal. T-statistics are not corrected for parameter
estimation.
"Goodness-of-fit statistic for the overall table (64


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Trinomial Outcome Model of Strike Probability and Duration






















1. 0—14 day strike

















Probability of Long Strike:
3. 0—14 day strike








5. Relative time—effect on













56.17 55.68 55.21 55.85
Notes: 'A1l models include a four-step time function normalized to have aunit
effect on the probability of a strike. The coefficient in row 5 gives the
relative effect of this time function on the probability of a strike
longer than 14 days.
'Model includes four grouped industry effects in probability of strike and
probability of long strike equations. The industry effects are restricted
to enter proportionately in the two equations. The estimated relative
effect of the industry variables in the duration equation is .17 (with a
standard error of .18).
Goodness-of—fit to 64 element table of strike incidence outcomes. The
statistic does not account for estimation of the parameters in the model.Appendix Table 1
Strike Characteristics by Year: Sample of Six Contracts for Each Pair
Number Strike Probability (PercejjjAveragePercent of
Adusted for Strike Strikes
Year of
Unadjusted Industry Duration Longer than Contracts ..a/ Composition Days 2 Weeks
1960 and earlier 10 30.0 23.2 52.7 100.0
1961 26 15.4 6.8 11.0 25.0
1962 42 7.1 2.6 21.0 33.3
1963 40 2.5 0.9 35.0 100.0
1964 71 11.3 7.6 20.1 50.0
1965 86 18.6 17.0 20.5 43.8
1966 65 13.9 15.9 23.0 55.5
1967 92 26.1 24.5 79.3 75.0
1968 92 25;0 23.7 47.0 86.9
1969 79 17.7 19.3 38.4 78.7
1970 92 23.9 23.6 64.1 86.4
1971 111 12.6 11.9 38.9 71.4
1972 68 11.8 14.9 23.6 25.0
1973 104 13.5 14.0 26.6 57.1
1974 135 18.5 19.3 31.7 64.0
1975 81 8.6 11.9 68.4 57.1
1976 95 17.9 18.6 52.7 76.5
1977 126 15.1 15.3 63.2 100.0
1978 66 16.7 19.8 50.0 72.0
1979 37 5.4 8.3 57.5 50.0
Note: 'Estimated year effects from linear probability model that also includes two-
digit industry effects.